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THE WRIT OF AMPARO: A REMEDY TO PROTECT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA
The Supreme Court of Argentina in recent years has been engaged in
the development of a new procedural remedy to provide effective protec-
tion for constitutional rights. The writ of amparo (the Spanish word for
protection) is a constitutional suit of a summary nature roughly compa-
rable to the Anglo-American writs of injunction and mandamus. The
development is noteworthy in two respects. First, it shows the Court at-
tempting to protect civil liberties in a country suffering from chronic politi-
cal instability and increasing military dominance. Secondly, it shows
the judiciary, in a civil law country, making law and ignoring codifica-
tion by the legislature.
In Latin America, constitutional limitations on governmental power
have generally not been effectively utilized to provide adequate protection
for the individual. Those constitutional provisions designed to protect
the individual from arbitrary infringements of basic human rights depend
upon the existence of an independent body which constitutes a check on
governmental and economic powers. The growth of an independent
judiciary has been adversely affected by the Latin American tradition of
authoritarianism. Evidence of this is found in Argentina where the gov-
ernment is strongly centralized. This centralization is marked by a great
concentration of power in the executive branch. The situation might be
characterized by the common, and somewhat simplistic, North American
concept of Latin America as being composed solely of dictatorial and mili-
taristic regimes.
Protection of constitutional rights is not, of course, a problem exclu-
sive to Argentina or other Latin American countries. In the United
States, where the executive power is more limited and the Supreme Court
is often viewed as the protector of civil liberties, the court has been an
unreliable defender of the individual, deferring often to the other branches
of the government or to public opinion in general.' Problems generally
associated wih Latin America are becoming more relevant in the United
States as concern spreads over the stability and independence of the courts,
repressive governmental measures, the concentration of economic wealth
abusively used against the masses by the few in control, and the increasing
influence of the military. These factors and the desire for change have
led to an increasingly polarized society marked by extremism and faction-
alism not unlike that which confronts the Argentine judiciary and the
Argentine people.
The judicially created remedy of arnparo marks an important step in
what might be termed an emerging constitutionalism in Argentina. The
1 L VY, JUDIcIL RIvIEW AND THE SUPRENE COURT, SELECTED ESSAYS 19-20 (1967).
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success of amparo, along with constitutional government, however is
threatened by continued political instability. The study here shows the
Supreme Court attempting to carve out a meaningful role for itself in
Argentine society by providing effective protection for civil liberties.
I. EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES TO
PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The protection of individual rights demands a judicial system which
affords effective remedies. Damage to fundamental human rights often
cannot be adequately restored by submission of a complaint to the ordi-
nary legal processes, which are typically dilatory. Extraordinary remedies,
providing rapid judicial relief, are needed.2
The method by which an individual could obtain protection for the
exercise of constitutional rights in Argentina, prior to the creation of the
writ of amparo in 1957, was generally limited to the ordinary judicial
processes. The ordinary procedure in the Argentine court system allows a
party to raise a constitional question at trial similar to United States prac-
tice. Appeal to the Supreme Court is provided by way of the recurso
extraordinario which is comparable to the common law writ of error.'
The recurso extraordinario, based on Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 of the United States Congress,4 gives the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over the final decisions of provincial courts and lower federal
courts involving federal and constitutional questions. The Supreme Court,
and all other courts in the country, have the power of judicial review.
While the power is not expressly granted in the Constitution, both court
decisions and some statutes recognize it.5 Yet, this power of review is in-
effective at times. Often when an individual is seeking relief from an
act that curbs the exercise of constitutional rights, the ordinary legal proc-
esses are so time-consuming that irreparable harm results.6
Some Latin American countries solved this problem by expanding
habeas corpus to protect constitutional rights other than personal liberty.7
A notable example is the Brazilian mandado de seguranca (writ of se-
curity). Early in its history, Brazil adopted the English common law
2 Samuel Kot, SRL, [1958-IV] Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] 216, 229, 92 Revista
Jurldica Argentina-La Ley [La Ley] 626, 636 (1958); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
491-92 (1965).
3 R. BIELSA, LA PRoTEccioN CoNsTITUTcsONAL Y EL REcURSO ExTRAoRDINARIo 181 n.3
(2d ed. 1958).
4 Id. at 57; S. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70 (1943) [hereinafter cited as
AmADEol.
5 AMADEO 73-75.
6 Cases cited note 2 supra; Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against
State Prosecutions In Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend In Federa-State Relations, 34 FoRD.
L. REV. 71, 103 (1965-66).
7 AmADEO 169.
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writ of habeas corpus.8 The writ, at common law, granted summary relief
against illegal restraint by superseding the ordinary legal procedure. How-
ever, it was an inappropriate remedy in cases involving rights other than
those of personal liberty. In Brazil, the writ was first expanded to in-
clude not only physical deprivations of liberty but also threatened depriva-
tions. It was later interpreted as a constitutional guarantee for the pro-
tection of all rights guaranteed therein. In 1926 the Constitution was
amended to restrict the use of habeas corpus to its original, limited scope.
In 1934, however, a new constitution created the mandado de seguranca.
The basic idea of the mandado de seguranca is to provide protection for
rights granted by the Constitution or other laws which are abused by the
public authority. The objective is to cover all rights left unprotected by
the restrictive and narrow writ of habeas corpus.10
The Mexican juicio de amparo is also a constitutional remedy, sum-
mary in character, to protect individual rights. The historical root of the
Mexican amparo is unclear, but it appears to have been based at least in
part on the English habeas corpus proceeding. 1 Early in the nineteenth
century, advocates of constitutional reform in Mexico were interested in
developing a device to protect against unconstitutional action by the
government. The amparo proceeding was established in the Mexican Con-
stitution of 1857.12 While it differs in some respects from the Argentine
amparo, the fundamental idea of constitutional protection through sum-
mary relief is found in both.13
The Argentine courts were urged many times to adopt an expansive
theory of habeas corpus such as Mexico and Brazil had done.'4 The
Supreme Court continually refused to do so. An example is found in the
8lider, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience in XXTH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CoNFLIcTs LAw 463, 465-69 (Nadelmann, Von Mehren, and Hazard ed.
1961).
0 2 T. SPELLING, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN EQUITY" AND AT LAw §
1152 (1893). The common law, however, provided other remedies of a summary nature. The
principle that "no wrong shall exist without a remedy" led to the development of extraordinary
remedies which were available when the common law writs were unable to prevent injustice.
axamples are found in the writs of injunction and mandamus. Both were based on the principle
that a party who could show the existence of a clear legal right which was being injured or
threatened by another party's action or inaction could seek a judicial order against that party
when no other adequate remedy was available. See 1 SPELLING §§ 1-35 and 2 SPELLING §
1368. While these are not constitutional remedies in origin, they can be used to protect against
invasions of constitutional rights.
10 Eder, Judicial Review in Latin America, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 570, 580-584 (1960).
,lid. at 599.
12 K KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COMPARATIVE
STUDY 619-20 (Latin American Studies Vol. 5, 1966).
1 3 See G. BiDART CAmpOS, REGIMEN LEGAL Y JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL AMPARO (1968)
who, in his extensive study of the Argentine amparo, includes many references to the similarities
and differences between Argentine and Mexican practice; see KARSY, supra note 12, at 614-646,
651-675 for case studies of the Mexican and Argentine amparo.
14 AMiADEO 169; BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 13, at 43-56.
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case of Ex Parte Bertotto."5 The postal authorities refused to send a pub-
lisher's newspaper through the mail because it contained incendiary items
calling for revolution. The publisher sought to compel the authorities to
mail the newspaper through the use of habeas corpus on the ground that
their action inhibited free speech. The Court, reasoning that habeas corpus
did not extend beyond the protection of personal bodily freedom, refused
the plaintiff's request.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AmPARO BY THE
ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1966
The Supreme Court of Argentina has from its inception exercised a
fairly high degree of independence. As early as 1887, the court estab-
lished the power of judicial review by declaring an act of the national
legislature unconstitutional. Through the years the court has become a
prominent and important Argentine institution. 6 The Court, however,
has at times been subject to the control of the executive. Shortly after
Juan Per6n came to power, he took action to relieve himself from any
possible embarrassment a meddlesome Court might cause. He impeached
all members of the Supreme Court with the exception of one judge-the
one who would agree with him.'7 Unfortunately, this was not the only
time such action was taken.
In such instances the executive has a passive judiciary for any action it
might wish to take. The Court acts as a rubber stamp lending an ap-
pearance of legality to the government. Therefore, when the Court does
move to protect an individual from illegal governmental action, it is note-
worthy because the Court cannot get too far out of line and still maintain
its existence. The development of the writ of amparo presents such a situ-
ation.
The Supreme Court departed from prior case law, such as that evi-
denced by Ex Parte Bertotto,"' in 1957. In Angel Sir'i9 the Court created
the writ of amparo. It held that the Constitution prohibited the judiciary
from relegating a petition for the protection of constitutional rights to the
ordinary judicial processes when rights were being arbitrarily violated by
the state. The police had dosed down the operation of a newspaper giv-
ing no reason for the action taken. This restrictive measure caused the
owner to suffer a violation of his right to work and infringed the freedom
of the press. The Court granted amparo to the petitioner, ordering the
police to lift the restriction on the newspaper. Recognizing the duty of
X1 [X)L J.A. 554, 559 (1933).
16 AmADEo, 49, 55, 61-62, 75. It should be noted that the Argentine judiciary derives its
power from constitutional provisions quite similar to article III of the United States Constitution.
17 A. WmTAKER, ARGENTwA 127 (1964).
18 Case cited note 15 supra.
19 [1958-I1) J.A. 476, 89 LaLey 531 (1957).
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the judiciary to uphold the Constitution, it was necessary, said the Court,
to find some means within the legal processes capable of protecting individ-
uals from arbitrary state action.
The departure from the traditional interpretation given by the Supreme
Court may have been motivated by a reaction to the dictatorial regime of
Juan Per6n who was overthrown in 1955. The Supreme Court had again
been purged, this time of Peronists, by provisional President Lonardi after
Per6n's downfall.20  General Lonardi placed new members on the Court
who, while not followers of Per6n, were in favor of Lonardi's policy of
national reconciliation to end the bitter strife between various political
factions. 1 Many who supported Per6n's overthrow advocated stern mea-
sures against the remaining members of the ousted dictator's party.
Prior to Sir, a person in the position of suffering a violation of a con-
stitutional right yet not deprived of physical liberty, could not have suc-
ceeded in a habeas corpus proceeding since the courts did not recognize
an expanded theory of habeas corpus. Siri's request for protection, which
in fact urged adoption of a remedy like the Mexican and Brazilian remedies
referred to above, had been dismissed by the court of the first instance.
The lower court interpreted the petition (recurso de amparo) as one for
habeas corpus (recurso de amparo de la libertad) and held that such a
petition would only lie to protect against an illegal deprivation of physical
liberty according to judicial precedent. 22
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Siri was that constitutional
rights, simply by being in the Constitution, required a procedural device
offering effective protection. Rights granted by the Constitution were of
primary importance. Protection of those rights not included within the
scope of habeas corpus was constitutionally required. Express legislative
authorization was not necessary in such a case due to the constitutional
basis of the action.
Over the next few years the Argentine judiciary labored to develop a
coherent body of law to govern the action of amparo.23  The basic ele-
ments for the issuance of the writ were set forth in Samuel Kot, S.R.L.24
... [Wjhenever it is dear and obvious that any restriction of basic hu-
man rights is illegal and also that submitting the question to the ordinary
administrative or judicial procedures would cause serious or irreparable
harm, it is proper for the judge immediately to restore the restricted right
through the swift method of the recourse of amparo .... [Jjudges must
take special pains... so that they do not decide, through the highly sum-
mary procedure of this constitutional guarantee, questions susceptible of
20 A. WHiTAKmR, ARGENTiNA 153 (1964).
21 Id.
22 [1958-I] J.A. at 481,89 La Ley at 534.
23See KARST, upra note 12, at 651-673 for the major cases decided during this period
which are presented in an English translation.
24 [1958-IV) J.A. 216,92 La Ley 626 (1958).
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greater debate and which should be resolved in accordance with the ordi-
nary procedures .... 25
The Court in Samuel Kot held that amparo would lie not only against
the acts of the state but also against arbitrary and illegal acts of individuals.
In this instance the Court ordered union members to evacuate a factory
that they illegally occupied thereby injuring the owner's right to work and
depriving him of his property. The threat of restricting constitutional
rights was not only inherent in the power of the state but also in the
power existent in many organizations of a private nature, such as large
businesses and labor unions. The Court noted that accumulation and
concentration of vast wealth and power in these organizations constituted
a very real source of concern in the area of personal liberties. 6 Amparo
finds its origin in the Constitution and focuses on the individual and his
basic human rights. It, therefore, grants protection whenever those rights
are being injured regardless of the legal identity of the actor, be it the
government or a private body. 7
Concern about possible misuse of the amparo proceeding is evidenced
by the warning the Supreme Court issued in Kot.28 Due to its summary
nature amparo does not provide full debate over the issue in question.
Amparo is properly granted only when the injurious act is manifestly il-
legal. This concept is a flexible one because the appraisal of an act as
manifestly illegal is somewhat difficult. 9 Kot provides an example of an
act that can be categorized as arbitrary without undue difficulty. The
workers occupying the factory made no claim of a legal right over the
property. There was no question which required extensive debate.30 How-
ever, the act of one party occupying the property of another contending to
hold title to the property might not be a blatantly illegal act. Such a
dispute might properly be litigated in the normal procedural fashion.
The protection of the defendant's right to be heard fully in cases where
he acts under a non-frivolous claim of possessing the right to so act by
law or where his action is not manifestly illegal should lead to denial of
the petition for amparo.
When the Siri case was handed down recognizing the constitutional
basis of amparo, there existed no procedural rules to govern such a pro-
25 KARST, supra note 12, at 657.
26 [1958-IV] J.A. at 228, 92 La Ley at 635.
2T A fundamental distinction should be noted here between the Argentine and United States
Constitution. The former enumerates the rights of individuals without reference to the parties
who are obligated to respect them. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 13, at 21. The Constitution
of the United States, however, frames the rights of individuals in a negative sense by prohibiting
the public authority, state or federal, from placing restrictions on those rights. Private viola-
tions of constitutional rights are not contemplated by the Constitution.
28 [1958-V J.A. at 229, 92 La Ley at 636.
29 BiDART CAMPOS, supra note 13, at 249-5 1.
3o ld. at 250; (1958-IV] J.A. at 229, 92 La Ley at 636.
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ceeding. It was determined that due to the similarity between habeas cor-
pus and amparo, the procedure for habeas corpus would be applicable to
actions of amparo. The courts, acting on their own initiative, ruled that
since habeas corpus had been codified in the federal law and amparo had
not, the statute regulating habeas corpus would apply except in those aspects
where incompatible with the nature of amparo.31
The constitutional remedy of amparo, which the Court deemed neces-
sary in order to curtail the abuse of the power of the executive branch
and certain private groups, was developed during a period of extreme
political and economic chaos. At such a time the writ of amparo was ex-
tremely important, yet the Court could not advance too rapidly against the
executive. The membership of the Supreme Court had changed with-the
military overthrow of Per6n. Since that time the military has either been
in power or maintained close supervision of governmental action under
constitutionally elected leaders.32
The Supreme Court, appointed by Lonardi, was maintained by the mili-
tary junta headed by General Arambum which deposed Lonardi after the
latter had been in power for only two months. The Court recognized the
de facto government of Arambum and generally presented no threat to
the junta's total control of the government. Aramburu was personally
committed to returning the country to constitutional government but took
strong repressive measures against the Peronists attempting to destroy
them before the civilians regained control.3
The government returned to a constitutionally elected president in
1958. President Frondizi lasted for four years of his six year term. In
1962 the military again took control, dissatisfied with what they considered
a soft line approach with the Peronists. 34
The story was repeated again. A nominal civilian government under
the true control of the military was recognized as legitimate by the Supreme
Court. 5 The more liberal faction of the armed forces prevailed over the
more conservative faction and elections were again held in 1963."6 The
new President, Arturo Illia, was ousted in 1966 by a conservative military
faction, which vowed its intent to rule the country for at least ten years.37
The position of the Supreme Court in these years was not sufficiently
stable to enable it to exercise an effective check on the executive power.
While the Court granted amparo in many cases, it often refrained from
81 BIDART CA.POS, supra note 13, at 98-99.
32 See WMAKER, supra note 17 for a general history of these years.
33ld. at 153-57.
841d. at 163-69.
35 Luis Maria Pirto, 252 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Ia Naci6n [Fallos) 177,
[1962-11) J.A. 514 (1962).
36 WMTAXR, supra note 17, at 167.
37R. ALEXANDBit, AN ImntODUCTION TO ARGmqnlNA 52-54 (1969). This objective
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ruling in cases where judicial intervention would have been untimely."8
The watchdog attitude of the military could hardly enhance an independ-
ent judicial role in the affairs of the government.
III. THE CODIFICATION OF AmPARO
Students of Argentine law, trained in the civil law tradition, are not as
accustomed to the concept of judge-made law as are the students of the
common law. The Napoleonic Code, the source of much of the law of
Argentina, emphasized the power of the legislature and displayed a dis-
trust of the judiciary. Judges were to apply the law, set forth in detailed
provisions, in an administrative manner with minimal interpretation.
However, this general principle is unrealistic. Judges constantly interpret
the law. A glance at the code of any civil law country convincingly dem-
onstrates that application without interpretation is not possible.
However, overt judicial law making, with no pretense of legislative au-
thorization, is relatively rare in civil law countries. But the action of
amparo was created solely by the Argentine Supreme Court with only a
single justice dissenting on the ground that the law came only from the
legislature.39
Demands for codification of amparo were not long in coming.40 One
writer, Bidart Campos, observed that the people feel more secure with a
principle of law embodied in a statute. Case law, he said, fails to provide
the sense of stability and the guarantee of certainty afforded by a detailed
statute.41
Nine years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in SiM
the action of amparo was codified by the military junta under the leader-
ship of General Juan Carlos Ongania which took control of the govern-
ment in June, 1966. As will be pointed out below, the statute regulating
amparo seemed to have the purpose of decreasing judicial intervention re-
garding action taken by executive. The question raised is to what extent
the legislature can change the judge-made law of amparo.
The security of constitutional government in Argentina remained un-
stable with the coming to power of the Revolutionary Junta in 1966.
Headed by Ongania, the junta issued the Act of the Argentine Revolu-
tion42 which, among other things, designated General Ongania as Presi-
went unfulfilled as the summer of 1970 saw another change with a different military faction in
power.
3 8 See cases collected in KARs'r, supra note 12, at 672, 673, 679.
39 [1958-1I] J.A. at 484, 89 La Ley at 536.
4 0 Romero, Necesidad Urgente De Una Ley De Amparo De Las Libertades Constitucionales,
[1961-lV] JA. 108.
4 1 Bidart Campos, Le Nueva Ley De Amparo, [1966-VI) J.A. sec. doct. 45.
4 2 Acta De La Revoluci6n Argentina, [1966) Anuario de Legislaci6n (Anuario) 234 (1966).
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dent, suspended Congress, and removed the justices of the Supreme Court,
authorizing their replacement by the President.43 It also declared that
* * * t~he government shall conform its commission to the dispositions
of this Statute, to those of the National Constitution and laws and decrees
dictated pursuant thereto to the extent they are not opposed to the goals
enunciated in the Act of the Argentine Revolution. 44
The decree, in effect, made the Act of the Argentine Revolution supreme
to the Constitution. The President and the new justices of the Supreme
Court were required to take an oath of allegiance to the goals of the
Revolution as well as to the Constitution.4 5
Law 16.986 regulating amparo was promulgated by the President on
October 18, 1966. Although proposed statutes had circulated before this
time in the Congress40 and within the executive branch,47 the actual pro-
mulgation of the law came without previous notice taking many by sur-
prise.48 Discussion of the law and the Court's interpretation of it follows.
The major provisions of the regulating statute are set forth in an appendix
to this article.
A. Amparo Against the Acts of Individuals
Article 1-The writ of amparo will be admissible against every act and
omission of public authority which, in its present or imminent form, in-
jures, restricts, alters or threatens, with manifest arbitrariness or illegality
the rights or guarantees explicitly or implicitly recognized by the National
Constitution, with the exception of individual liberty protected by habeas
corpus. 49
Article 1 of Law 16.986 differs in one major respect from the case law
in characterizing the nature of the act which gives rise to an action of
amparo. The statute recognizes the admissibility of the writ against an
act or omission by the public authority which injures or threatens consti-
tutional rights and is of an arbitrary nature. However, no reference is
made to acts of individuals or private entities.
The question of whether amparo would lie against the act of a private
party after the enactment of Law 16.986 was immediately raised in the
courts. In November, 1966, the National Chamber of Appeals of Peace
of the Federal Capital (intermediate appellate court) faced this issue in
43 Id. at 234-35.
44 fEstatuto De La Revolud6n Argentina, art. 3, in K. Karst & K. Rosenn, Supplementary
Materials on Law and Development in Latin America (1969).
4
5 Acta De La Revoluci6n Argentina, [1966] Anuario 235 (1966).
40 KARST, supra note 12, at 673.
47 Lazzarini, La Acci6n de Amparo y el Proyecto del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 116 La Ley
884 (1964).
4 8 BMnART CAmPOS, supra note 41, at 45.
40 Ley 16.986, [1967-A] Anuario 500 (1966).
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Diaz Colodero50 when a union discharged a member for allegedly violat-
ing union rules. The complainant, considering the dismissal manifestly
illegal since there had been no hearing, sought amparo.
The court held that amparo would lie against the act of a private or-
ganization.
[D]espite its apparently all inclusive denomination ('Action of
Amparo-Regulating Law'), the legal text referred to proposes only to
regiment, with regard to both substance and form, the right and the exer-
cise of the action of amparo in certain types of proceedings: those in
which the injury to a constitutionally declared liberty is attributable to the
public authority, leaving the others (aggressions committed by individuals
or private entities) submitted to the guiding principles laid down by the
doctrine and case law starting with the leading case of Kot51
No indication was found by the court which suggested an intent to
lay aside the case law. The court was unable to accept the conclusion
that the framers of the statute intended to reverse the opinions of many
judges and eminent treatise writers "'by way of a simple omission. 5 2
To the contrary, the court noted that the origin of amparo was in the
Constitution which granted certain rights to all individuals. In addition
to the case law, the statutes of various provinces and some proposed stat-
utes considered the identity of the aggressor irrelevant. These were
referred to in the submission of the project of the amparo statute to the
President as worthy precedent. Thus, felt the court, without an express
reservation to the contrary, the case law which granted the writ of amparo
against private parties must be considered to be in full effect.53
The court also reconciled its interpretation of Law 16.986 with the
objectives of the Act of the Argentine Revolution. The court did not
directly enter into the problem posed by the Act to the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. However, it noted that the principles of the Consti-
tution granted respect to the fundamental rights of man, and the recogni-
tion of such rights demanded the use of the amparo action to insure
their exercise. The objectives of the National Revolution, said the court,
were not opposed to the principles of the Constitution, but to the contrary,
were in total accord with the Constitution in respecting individual lib-
erties.54
It is questionable whether Law 16.986 could constitutionally have
50 [1967-II] J.A. 356 (1966).
5ld. at 357. The quotation cited is taken from a translation in Karst and Rosenn, supra
note 44.
52 Id.
531d. at 360. In fanuel Perndndez Goncdlves, [1967-1) J.A. 73, 125 La Ley 416 (1966),
another division of the same court, facing an identical question, refused to follow the defend-
ants suggestion that the new law had abolished amparo against acts of private parties. The
court said that to so hold would be to return to the state of the law before Kot and ignore the
judicial creation of amparo.
r4 [1967-11 J.A. at 357.
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been interpreted as excluding the writ of amparo against the acts of in-
dividuals or private entities without overruling the Kot case. It was sug-
gested, prior to the holding in Diaz Colodrero, that Law 16.986, if inter-
preted as constituting the exclusive federal remedy for amparo, would be
unconstitutional since a statute cannot prohibit a guarantee required by the
Constitution. 5
In September, 1967 an attempt was made to remedy the defect of Law
16.986 in the Civil and Commercial Procedural Code of the Nation. 6
Article 321 provides that the summary process as established in article
49817 will be applicable
[w~hen a complaint is made against the act or omission of an individual
which, in its present or imminent form, injures, restricts, alters or threat-
ens with manifest arbitrariness or illegality some right or guarantee ex-
plicitly or implicitly recognized by the National Constitution, whenever
the urgent reparation of the injury or the immediate cessation of the ef-
fects of the act is necessary, and the question, by its nature, ought not to
be tried by any of the established procedures of this Code or other laws.5s
The Code, which became effective in February 1968, only partially fills
the legislative gap left by Law 16.986. While governing the civil and
commercial courts, it is not applied by the criminal, labor, and economic
penal courts.59 Therefore, these courts have no procedural statute to
follow in a petition for amparo against the act of an individual.
Since these courts are required to hear a petition requesting the issu-
ance of the writ of amparo in such cases by the doctrine in Kot, the re-
maining question is the procedure to be followed. The labor courts, by
Law 17.639,60 now apply the new civil code to their cases where it is
compatible with their prior procedure. Bidart Campos suggests three pos-
sibilities for the criminal courts and the special criminal court for economic
matters.6 ' One is application of the summary procedure of the new
civil code. Even though it does not specifically apply to all federal courts,
application by analogy would give the courts a procedure established spe-
cifically to regulate amparo against private acts. Secondly, the courts
could use the procedure of Law 16.986. Though it specifically regulates
an action against the public authority, it applies to all federal judges.
Basing jurisdiction on the constitutional nature of amparo, the judges
could use the procedure directly granted to them by the statute. As a
Ur BDART CAMiPos, supra note 41, at 46-7.
GGLey 17.454--Codigo Procesal Civil y Commerdal de ]a Nad6n, [1967-A] Anuario
533 (1967).
57id. at 583.
8 Id. at 570.
GO The Penal Economico is a special criminal court established to deal with the increasing
number of violations of the laws regulating the economy.
G0 [1968-A] Anuario 491 (1968).
61 BIDART CAmpos, supra note 13, at 115-117.
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third possibility, the courts could use the standards as developed by the
case law. Before the amparo statute was enacted, all courts followed the
procedure designed for habeas corpus. Since no specific procedure has been
established for these courts, they could continue this practice.
B. Effective Protection by Existing Legal Remedies
Article 2-The writ of amparo will not be admissible when: (a) Judicial
or administrative recourses or remedies exist which permit obtaining pro-
tection of the constitutional right or guarantee at issue; 62
Article 2 (a) has been interpreted as codifying the prior case law with-
out change. 3 The statutory standard, though, has been criticized for its
vagueness." While not contrary to the law developed by the courts, it is
incomplete inasmuch as it leaves undefined the test to be applied to deter-
mine when the available remedy provides protection and when it does not.
The objective of amparo is effective protection by the immedate re-
establishment of one's constitutional rights. The statute requires the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies and the use of existing judicial reme-
dies. The right to bring an action in arnparo arises when such remedies
do not permit a party to obtain effective protection. The question is when
are the available remedies unable to provide this protection. The Supreme
Court in Kot seemed to answer this in the best fashion when it focused
on the ability of the existing remedies to avoid grave and irreparable harm
to the injured party."5
Special administrative remedies, established to resolve disputes by the
agency which has allegedly violated the constitutional rights of an indi-
vidual, must be exhausted before an amparo proceeding will lie. If such
a remedy is not used, the injury complained of is considered uncertain and
indefinite.0 6 However, as the Supreme Court has recently held, where the
actor (executive power) has made clear its intention to continue the action
complained of by a party, it is not necessary to use an administrative
remedy which in such a case is purely illusory."
The existence of an apt legal means, administrative or judicial, whether
an ordinary or extraordinary remedy, forbids the use of amparo68 The
proceeding of amparo is not to be used as a substitute for established pro-
62 Ley 16.986, [1967-A] Anuario 500 (1966).
63 Confederaci6n Gral. de Empleados de Commercio de la Republica Argentina, [1967-VI],
J.A. 95, 97 (C. Trab. Cap. 1967).
64 BIDART CAMPos, supra note 41, at 47.
65 BIDART CAMPos, supra note 13, at 191-92.
66 G. BIDART CAMI'os, DEREcHo DE AMPARO 147-48 (1961).
67 Marcelo Sinchez Sorondo, [1968-MI J.A. 56 (Corte Sup. de Justicia 1968).
6BAntonio Gallardo, [1959-I] J.A. 635, 94 La Ley 749 (Corte Sup. de Justicia 1958);
Confederaci6n Gral. de Empleados de Comercio de la Republica Argentina, [1967-VI] J.A. 95
(C. Trab. Cap. 1967).
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cedural remedies even when the issue concerns a violation of a constitutional
right. However, the existing means are considered inapt when submission
of the claim would cause grave and irreparable harm to the plaintiff.69
C. Acts of the Judiciary and Exercise of the National Defense Law
Article 2-The writ of amparo will not be admissible when: ... (b) The
challenged act emanates from an organ of the judicial power or has been
adopted by the express application of Law 16.970 (National Defense
Law); 70
The declaration in article 2(b), that amparo is inadmissible if the act
complained of emanates from the judicial branch, is completely in accord
with the case law.?1 A complainant may not institute a separate proceed-
ing seeking amparo from the decision of a judge which he considers ar-
bitrary.72  The reasoning behind this prohibition is that to permit a judge
foreign to a cause to overturn the decision of the judge of another competent
court would bring about insecurity and instability in the judicial system. 73
Amparo is not to be invoked as a substitute for appellate review.
An act exercised under the provisions of the National Defense Law74
may not be attacked by way of amparo according to the second clause of
article 2(b). The defense statute was promulgated October 10, 1966 just
prior to the enactment of the amparo statute. No cases arising under this
provision of the amparo statute have been found.75  The basic principles
of the statute provide for an organization capable of protecting national
security, establishing long range goals for development, and strengthening
the national conscience over the problems inherent with security. These
various goals are to be accomplished through a national security council
with both military and intelligence committees. The implementation of
the broad grants of authority given to these committees could have a very
restrictive effect on the exercise of various constitutional rights. The ef-
fective protection of these rights requires the writ of amparo. The article
2 (b) exemption is, therefore, somewhat disturbing.
In part, the prohibition of the use of amparo against the express appli-
cation of the defense law is not new. During a declared state of siege,
60 Generally such harm results from ordinary procedures due to their characteristically
dilatory nature, Samuel Kot, S.R.L., [1958-IV] J.A. 216, 228, 92 La Ley 627, 635 (1958),
or in administrative remedies from appreciable delay, Confederacidn Gral. de Empleados de
Comrcio de la Republica Argentina, [1967-VI] J.A. 95, 98 (C. Trab. Cap. 1967) and Eduardo
L. Vila, [1968-11 JA. 284, 285 (Corte Sup. de Justida 1967) or when the procedural route is
illusory, Marcelo SUnchez Sorondo, [1968-IV] J.A. 56, 57 (Corte Sup. de Justicia 1968).
70 Ley 16.986, [1967-A] Anuario 500 (1966).
71 BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 13, at 184-86.
7 2 BIDART CAmPOS, supra note 66, at 221.
73 Id. at 226.
74 Ley 16.970, [1967-A] Anuario 659 (1966).
75 This is based on research in Jurisprudencia Argentina up through the 1968 volumes.
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due to internal disorder or foreign attack, constitutional rights are sus-
pended by the express terms of the Constitution.76 The courts of Argen-
tina have held that acts of the state under such conditions may not be
attacked by an amparo proceeding since the declaration is political and,
therefore, not susceptible to judicial review.7 7  The non-allowability of
amparo regarding the application of the National Defense Law under a
declared state of siege would have, therefore, judicial support.
A more difficult issue would be raised if action taken under the Na-
tional Defense Law were alleged to have violated constitutional rights
during a period when there had been no formal declaration of a state of
siege. Such a situation would raise the question of whether article 2(b)
of the law regulating amparo could constitutionally prohibit the issuance of
a writ of amparo. It has been suggested in this connection that the courts
should follow the statutory standards established to guarantee the exercise
of constiutional rights, but only to the extent that such standards do not
denaturalize the constitutional basis of the guarantees.7" Prohibiting judi-
cial protection of constitutional rights in every phase of governmental
action which is labelled as a "national security" measure dearly undermines
the Constitution and the case law.
D. judicial Intervention Compromising Activities Essential to the State
Article 2-The writ of amparo will not be admissible when: ... (c) Ju-
dicial intervention would directly or indirectly compromise the regularity,
continuity and efficacy of performance of a public service, or the develop-
ment of activities essential to the state;79
The potential diminution of the action of amparo exists in section (c)
of article 2 as well as in section (b) referred to above. This provision is
clearly inconsistent with the constitutional theory of amparo. On its face,
the section is so extensive and vague that it could destroy judicial protec-
tion afforded by amparo. It would seem difficult in many cases to hold
that a judicial order of protection would not, at least indirectly, compro-
mise the regularity, continuity, and efficacy of an activity essential to the
state whatever such activity might be. First, Decree-Law 16.986 creates
the writ of amparo against manifestly illegal governmental acts. Then,
the law proceeds to take away the writ of amparo when granting protec-
tion would adversely affect state activities. Suppose, for example, that
the police, during a period of social unrest, silence all criticism and dissent
of governmental policies. Those silenced, as plaintiffs, might properly re-
quest judicial intervention on their behalf. It would seem absurd to per-
76 Argentine Coast. art. 23 (1853) (Pan American Union Translation).
77K AS, supra note 12, at 694-95.
78A. Robredo, La Acci6n de Amparo y la Reciente Ley 16.986, 124 La Ley 1292, 1296
(1966).
79 Ley 16.986, [1967-A) Anuario 500 (1966).
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mit the government, as defendant, to succeessfully defend on the ground
that intervention by the court might compromise the effectiveness of govern-
mental programs by increasing or permitting criticism.
Section (c) of article 2 has apparently never been subject to judicial
interpretation. There is no support for the provision in the case law
prior to 1966. It would seem that a court, confronted with a defense under
section (c), would have to interpret it with the view that the primary con-
cern is constitutionality as opposed to efficiency. Refusal by a court to
grant amparo against an unconstitutional act because such action might
impair the state's activities would be tantamount to saying that the judi-
ciary has no role to play in the area of civil liberties. s0
E. Need for Greater Debate and Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Article 2-The writ of amparo will not be admissible when: ... (d) The
determination of the eventual invalidity of the act requires greater ampli-
tude of debate or proof, or declaring laws, decrees, or ordinances un-
constitutional;8 '
The principle of article 2 (d), that amparo should not be granted when
the issues presented require greater amplitude of debate, is consonant with
prior judicial doctrine. The idea goes to the character of the summary
procedure of amparo which emphasizes promptness and simplicity. This is
considered as not only necessary for the protection of constitutional rights,
but also as sufficient for the protection of the defendant because the writ
can only be issued upon a finding of a manifestly illegal or arbitrary act.
The very nature of the injurious act requires no extended debate. On the
other hand, regular judicial proceedings should be used when the act com-
plained of is not clearly illegal. This principle was recognized by the
Supreme Court in the Kot case.8 2
The Supreme Court in 19678 rejected a complaint of amparo on the
grounds of article 2(d) of the new law. The executive had intervened
in the activities of a union allegedly acting in areas outside its legally
designated economic function. The intervention by the government was
based on the objectives declared in the Act of the Argentine Revolution of
1966.4 The determination of whether the alleged political activities of
some union members had taken place and the corresponding validity of the
government's entrance into the affairs of the union could not be made,
judged the Court, within a proceeding of amparo. The dispute required
80 For criticism on article 2(c) see BIDART CANPos, supra note 41, at 47 and Robredo,
supra note 78, at 1296. The provision of article 2(c) is almost identical to a provision in the
proposed statute of the executive branch in 1964, see Lazzarini, supra note 47, at 889-90.
81 Ley 16.986, [1967-A] Anuario 500 (1966).
8- (1958-IV] J.A. at 229,92 La Ley at 636.83 Sindicato de Prensa, 268 Fallos 16, [1967-V] J.A. 36 (1967).
84 Id.
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... an adequate debate and the production of corresponding proof, all of
which exceed the stringent limits of a proceeding of the character [of
amparo] attempted here and are appropriate to an ordinary proceeding.85
The second part of article 2(d) reaffirms the principle established pre-
viously by the courts that the action of amparo was not the proper pro-
cedural route for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a law or de-
cree. Many cases held generally that while amparo existed in order to re-
store constitutional rights affected by illegitimate acts, it was not the proper
proceeding if the granting of amparo expressly declared or necessarily
implied the unconstitutionality of a law.86
The opinions of the courts have been described as establishing a "vague
criterion."8 7 Essentially, the reasoning of the courts was as follows. There
existed no declaratory action of unconstitutionality to attack a law or
decree. This idea, that the judgment of the legislature or of the executive
should not be contested by such an action, demonstrated that the laws of
Congress and executive decrees carried a presumption of validity. In order
to rebut this presumption, the courts required a concrete case or actual
dispute tested by way of a hearing with full debate from the litigating
parties. The proceeding of amparo, being highly summary in character,
did not provide sufficient debate of the issues necessarily involved in the
consideration of the validity of the law in issue.88
The judicial branch, early in its history, declared the power of judicial
review to be implicit in the Constitution. 9 However, their concern over
the delicate balance between the three branches of the government seemed
to lead to the conclusion that for a judge to overrule the act of another
branch, through the summary process of amparo, would be improper. The
exercise of the power to declare a law unconstitutional called for a greater
confrontation of the issues provided only by the normal judicial procedures.
In J. Carlos Outon y otros,90 already labelled a leading case, the Supreme
Court, in 1967, held that while in principle an action of amparo was im-
proper to declare a law or decree unconstitutional, an exception arises
when the law or decree is manifestly illegal. Here, by an executive decree,
all maritime workers were required to present identification of union
membership in order to be permitted to work. Some workers brought an
85 268 Fallos at 20, [1967-V) J.A. at 38.
86 BIDmAT CAMPoS, supra note 13, at 136; J. Carlos Outon y Otros, [1967-Il] J.A. 369,
370 (2a Instancia 1965).
87 B1DART CAMPos, supra note 13, at 136.
88 Asseradero Clipper, S.R.L., 249 Fallos 221, 226-7, [1961-IV] J.A. 108, 109, 109-11
(Corte Sup. de Justicia 1961); see BiDAaT CAMPos, supra note 13, at 144 and Noailles,
Posibilidad De Dedarar La Inconstitucionalidad De Leyes, Decretos U Ordenanzas En Proced-
imientos De Amparo-Interpretaci6a De Una Ley De Amparo-Los Derechos De Trabajar, De
Asociaci6n y De Sindicaci6n Libre y Democratica, 126 La Ley 292, 294 (1967).
89 AMADEO 73.
90 267 Fallos 215, (1967-111 J.A. 369 (1967).
[Vol. 31
NOTES
action in amparo to have the decree declared unconstitutional since it
violated the right to work and the right of free association by essentially
requiring them to join the union.
The concern of the courts had been to avoid precipitous declarations of
unconstitutionality by way of amparo proceedings. Yet, even though this
rule would govern the majority of cases, it was necessary to create an ex-
ception in certain cases.
[W~hen the dispositions of a law, decree, or ordinance dearly result in
violations of any human rights the existence of the regulation cannot con-
stitute an obstacle to the immediate reestablishment . . . of the violated
fundamental rights.9 '
Article 2(d) could not be interpreted as establishing an absolute rule.
It must be read as
... a reasonable measure designed to prevent the amparo action from be-
ing utilized capriciously to impede effective enforcement of laws and regu-
lations dictated in accordance with.., the Constitution.92
The Court found this interpretation as necessary in order to conform article
2(d) with the purpose of the statute which was to assure the protection
of individual guarantees against arbitrary acts. The institution of amparo
would be destroyed, if a decree were found manifestly illegal as violative
of a constitutional right and the courts were prohibited from granting relief
due to an absolute interpretation of the rule. 3
Concerning the propriety of judicial review in such cases, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the Constitution obligated the judiciary to uphold
the rights contained therein. The supremacy clause demanded respect
for the Constitution, especially regarding the protection of individual rights.
The Supreme Court had the power to decide all cases arising under the
Constitution. As long as the cause was justiciable, regardless of the pro-
cedural device employed, no one could interfere with this obligation."
Significantly, there was no mention in the Court's opinion of the Act of the
Argentine Revolution which had been decreed as being supreme to the
Constitution."9 As to the impropriety of dedaring a law unconstitutional
in an amparo proceeding, the Court pointed out that deference to ordinary
judicial procedures is not necessary where a law or decree is dearly or
manifestly illegal.
The decision of the Court in Outon is an interesting and important one
in two respects. First, the greater legal protection afforded by the Court
91 Karst and Rosenn, supra note 44. The quotation appears in the case reports 267 Fallos at
218, [1967-1 J.A. at 371.
02 Id.
9 267 Fallos at 219-220, [1967-11) J.A. at 371-72.
941d. at 220, [1967-Il] J.A. at 372.
Or Estatuto De La Revoluci6n Argentina art. 3, [1966) Anuario 233 (1966).
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to individuals through the holding expanded judicial review in actions of
amparo and subverted the intent of the decree-law. Secondly, it is signifi-
cant for the time chosen by the Court to extend their review of the acts of
the public authority. The Court itself was composed of new members ap-
pointed by President Ongana after the removal of the justices on the bench
in 1966. The position of Supreme Court justices had not been stable dur-
ing periods of political crises. Too independent a role by the Court could
hardly have been expected. Yet the decision, at least in theory, reflects a
fairly large step toward greater judicial review.
The Supreme Court took advantage of the political situation in a fash-
ion similar to the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison."
The dosed shop decree, which was declared unconstitutional in Outon, had
been issued by President Illia in 1964.17 The junta ruling in 1967, which
had overthrown Illia in 1966, favored the effect of the decision which rec-
ognized the right to work to both union and non-union members. The
junta itself was intent on purging the country of Peronism of which the
unions were the main source. The decision of the Court was a hard blow
to unionism. The Attorney General expressly argued before the Court in
Outon that amparo be granted to the non-union workers0 8 The Court
then was able to grant amparo in the case, complying with the desire of the
administration and, at the same time, recognizing an exception to article
2(d) of the administration's law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The development of amparo by the Argentine Supreme Court and the
subsequent judicial interpretation of the statute codifying the writ demon-
strate important inroads on the problem of protecting individual rights.
While the writ was instituted in part as a reaction to years of dictatorial
government, its continuing development and efficacy have been tempered
by constant political instability and extremism. The Supreme Court has
been able, however, to create and, to a degree, expand the writ of amparo
during this period when its need is vital. The Court has done so with its
own existence almost continually threatened by numerous changes in exe-
cutive branch.
The effect of Law 16.986 regulating amparo is uncertain. It should
lead to more uniform and effective application of the writ by judges trained
in the civil law tradition. However, the Court has made it dear through
the Outon case that the action of amparo is a constitutional remedy not
subject to curtailment by the other branches of government. The judges
90 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Here Chief Justice Marshall's holding favored the ad-
ministration of the new President, Thomas Jefferson, who was a political foe of Marshall's.
9 7 Decreto No. 280, [1964] Anuario 102 (1964).
98 267 Fallos at 216-17, [1967-I] J.A. at 370.
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could have merely applied the new statute and ignored the prior case law
development. That this did not happen illustrates the unwillingness of
the courts to relinquish both their practice of interpretation of the Con-
stitution and their ability to create what they deem to be necessary remedies.
It is apparent that one aim of the executive in issuing the statute was
to limit the use of amparo in suits against the acts of the federal govern-
ment. The potential effect of the law through the prohibitions of the is-
suance of the writ contained in article 2(b) and (c) could be destruction
of the fundamental objective of amparo. The restriction of amparo in
cases involving the National Defense Law, or in instances where its use
would directly or indirectly affect the efficiency of the state, clearly favors
the state over the individual. The extent to which the Court can go in
declaring these prohibitions unconstitutional, or in creating exceptions to
them, remains to be seen. Much depends on the direction taken by the
executive. Return to a constitutionally elected government and a lessening
of social and political unrest are essential requirements to a greater role by
the Court.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Outon and holdings in other
cases where the Court has granted amparo against executive acts"9 picture
the Court asserting a degree of independence. Yet how effective can the
Supreme Court be in protecting individual rights? Effective judicial review
is not realistically possible'in a society split by extreme political factions
of the right and left. Such is the situation in Argentina at present. The
judiciary must attempt to carve out a role for itself where some degree of
limited review can be exercised over the executive. Deference to the ex-
ecutive is undoubtedly required often. Hopefully, though, the maintenance
of a degree of independence will provide some protection to constitutional
rights realizing that truly effective protection is not possible.
Thomas E. Roberts
APPENDIx-LAw 16.986: ECURSO DE AmPARO' 00
Article 1-The writ of amparo will be admissible against every act and
omission of public authority which, in its present or imminent form, in-
jures, restricts, alters or threatens, with manifest arbitrariness or illegality,
the rights or guarantees explicitly or implicitly recognized by the National
Constitution, with the exception of individual liberty protected by habeas
corpus.
Article 2-The writ of amparo will not be admissible when:
99 Hern.n Argijello Argiiello v. Dir. Nac. de Migraciones, 268 Fallos 393, [1968-1] J.A.
286 (1967). Here the Supreme Court granted amparo to an alien after the federal authorities
had ordered him to leave the country on the grounds that he was a political activist with leftist
views. The Court found no evidence supporting such a contention.
100 This translation of the statute can be found in Karst and Rosenn, supra note 44.
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(a) Judicial or administrative recourses or remedies exist which permit
obtaining protection of the constitutional right or guarantee at issue;
(b) The challenged act emanates from an organ of the judicial power or
has been adopted by the express application of Law 16.970 [The Na-
tional Defense Law];
(c) Judicial intervention would directly or indirectly compromise the reg-
ularity, continuity and efficacy of performance of a public service, or
the development of activities essential to the state;
(d) The determination of the eventual invalidity of the act requires
greater amplitude of debate or proof, or declaring laws, decrees, or
ordinances unconstitutional;
(e) The complaint has not been presented within 15 workdays, starting
from the date on which the act was executed or ought to have taken
effect.
Article 3-If the writ is clearly inadmissible, the judge shall reject it sum-
marily, ordering the archiving of the proceedings.
Article 4-The Judge of the First Instance with jurisdiction in the place
where the act is manifested or has or could have effect, shall be compe-
tent to grant the writ of amparo.
Article 5-The writ of amparo may be brought by any individual or juridi-
cal entity, either personally or by attorney, who considers himself affected
in conformance with provisions set out in article 1.
Article 6-The complaint shall be in writing and shall set out:
(a) The name, surname, and real (and designated) domicile of the com-
plainant;
(b) The identification, insofar as is possible, of the author of the im-
pugned act or omission;
(c) Relation of the extreme circumstances which have produced or are
about to produce injury to a constitutional right or guarantee;
(d) The relief requested, in clear and precise terms.
Article 7-The complainant shall accompany the written complaint with
the documentary proof at his disposal; if not within his control, he shall
identify it and indicate the place where it may be found.
He shall also indicate other measures of proof upon which he intends
to rely.
The number of witnesses may not exceed five for each party.
Article 8-When the suit is admissible, the judge shall require the cor-
responding authority to submit, within a prudently fixed period, a report
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setting forth the background and bases of the impugned measure. Failure
to request such a report is cause for nullity of the process.
When the report has been produced, or the period fixed for its submittal
has elapsed, and the complainant has no proof to transmit, judgment con-
ceding or denying amparo shall be entered within 48 hours.
Article 9--If any of the parties have offered proof, its immediate produc-
tion shall be ordered, with a date for the hearing to be fixed within three
days.
Article 11-When the report referred to in Article 8 has been submitted,
or, where called for, an evidentiary hearing has taken place, the judge
shall render his decision within three days....
Article 12-A judgment which grants the writ shall contain:
(a) Concrete mention of the authority against whose resolution, act, or
omission amparo has been conceded;
(b) Precise determination of the conduct to be observed....
(c) The time by which the result must be carried out.
Article 13-The final decision, which declares the existence or nonexist-
ence of the injury, restriction, alteration or arbitrary or manifestly illegal
threat to a constitutional right or guarantee, is res judicata with respect to
the amparo, leaving unaffected the exercise of actions or recourses which
the parties may have independent of amparo.
Article 15-Only final judgments, the resolutions provided for in Article 3,
and ... [decisions with a suspensive effect] shall be appealable. The ap-
peal shall be taken within 48 hours of notification of the result challenged
and shall set forth reasons for the challenge. [The appeal shall be either
denied or granted within 48 hours.1 In the latter case, the matter shall
be sent up to the respective appellate court within 24 hours of being
granted.
Article 17-The procedural rules in effect are supplemental of the preced-
ing norms.
Article 18-This law shall apply in the Federal Capital and in the terri-
tory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica, and the Isles of the South Atlantic.
It shall also be applied by federal judges in the provinces in cases in
which the act impugned by writ of amparo stems from a national authority.
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